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Author's Reply

MAYBE STATISTICS HAVE SOMETHING
TO TELL US, AFTER ALL
By Earl Johnson, Jr.
When Ann Drew and I accepted the invitation to publish an article based on the comparative statistical
work our program was then doing, we knew we ran
the risk of a Langbein-like critique. In some respects,
his piece represents fair comment on the article-but
not the research. (I have some quarrel with his reasoning about the article, too, which I will take up shortly.)
We knew it would be impossible to insert all the explanations and qualifications present in the full 300
page report within the page limits of the article. In the
full report, for instance, there is a section describing
just the German legal system which is nearly as long
as our entire article that was published in the Summer
1978 issue of The Judges' Journal. There is virtually nothing in Professor Langbein's critique which
is not highlighted in that section of our full report.
At the time we decided to prepare the article we
knew that the data, however explained and qualified,
were open to various interpretations and conclusions,
as is true of most statistical information. We anticipated that others would offer their interpretations. In
that sense, we welcome Professor Langbein's article,
although we do not find it nearly as devastating as he
evidently does.
I first want to emphasize that much of our article
and many of its most significant findings remain undisturbed by Professor Langbein's critique.
In our article we emphasized those statistics from
our study which seemed to run counter to what we
suspected were common assumptions about the
United States justice system. If one were to ask the
average American which country has the most judges
per capita, I suspect the overwhelming majority would
answer "Why the United States." And if asked who
spent the most per capita on judges, "The United
States, of course." And where is legal aid most generously funded? "Clearly the good old U.S. of A." That
these notions are held by important policy makers, if
not the common citizen, is suggested by a statement in
an article authored last year by Anthony Kline, probably the most influential figure with respect to courtrelated legislation in the nation's largest state. Kline
writes that "With a complement of 1312 judges, commissioners and referees, California has a far larger
judicial system than exists in any nation in the world;
indeed, there are few nations that have as many
judges, absolutely and per capita, as Los Angeles
County."'
Earl Johnson, Jr., is professor of law at the Law Center of the

University of Southern California.

I should add that I regard Mr. Kline as a friend and
find many of the suggested reforms described later in
his article to be commendable. But as the information
in our study indicated, he was reflecting a widely held
but erroneous assumption about the statistical facts
and where the United States stands in comparison to
other countries.
Nothing in the Langbein piece refutes the finding
that West Germany-as well as several other European countries-has significantly more judges per
capita than typical American jurisdictions. 2 Nor does
his critique undermine the finding that Germany
spends twice as much on its court system whether
measured per capita or as a percentage of national income.' In fact, Langbein leaves largely untouched the
principal thrust of our article-that the statistical
facts were, on the whole, inconsistent with a widely accepted view that our justice system is huge and overly
expensive compared with other countries. And thus
we questioned, and continue to question, whether
public policy and funding decisions should be predicated on false notions that ours is a uniquely expensive system of justice.
Langbein's quarrel appears to be with any affirmative use of this data to support in any way a larger
public investment in America's justice system. In
truth his real quarrel appears to be with the title of the
article, "This Nation Has Money For Everything-Except Its Courts," a title which we did not
choose and does not accurately capture the modest
tone of our suggestions from the data.'
But beyond this, Langbein's critique misconceives
what it is we suggested might be underfinanced, comparatively speaking. Typically, in his very first paragraph Langbein excerpts a section from our article in
which we point out that America's relative underinvestment of public resources in its total justice system might sabotage the performance of the judicial
system precisely because our approach is so adversarial and, hence, dependent upon private parties to
finance the necessary investigation, etc. Langbein
construed that to mean we were arguing that the judicial system was being sabotaged by an inadequate investment in the judicial system itself. That may be
true also but the excerpt Langbein chose to use applied to legal aid and other elements of the justice system rather than the courts.'
But putting these issues of tone and interpretation
aside, let us examine the Langbein thesis itself. Briefly
stated it seems to amount to this: the admittedly
(Please turn to page 7)
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(Continuedfrom page 5)
greater public investment in the courts in West Germany cannot be used in any way to justify more generous appropriations for the American justice system
because the Germans use an inquisitorial approach
which places greater responsibility on the judiciary for
developing the evidence and the issues. Therefore, it is
to be expected that the German taxpayer will pay a lot
more for each case and for the total system.
There are at least two answers to the Langbein proposition. The first is that the differences between the
inquisitorial and adversarial processes do not logically
justify a difference in the level of public financing for
the justice system. Instead, at most they justify a different distribution of the public investment. One
might reasonably anticipate that because of its adversary approach, which places so much responsibility on
the lawyers representing the parties, the United States
would invest heavily in legal aid and other programs
to subsidize those litigants unable to afford the cost of
all these responsibilities. In effect, while most of the
justice system dollar in Germany goes to the judiciary,
in America we would expect it to be divided nearly
equally between the courts and subsidized legal representation.
But what do we find? It is Germany that has had a
legal guarantee of free counsel for low income civil litigants dating back to 1871.6 We still have no such
guarantee in the United States.7 And while England,
which like the United States uses an adversarial system, has begun to to move toward the anticipated
relationship between judicial and civil legal aid
expenditures, the United States has not. In 1973,
England's civil legal aid budget was over 25 percent as
large as its judicial budget while America's was only 5
percent as large.' Significantly, the United States did
not even compare favorably with Sweden which uses a
semi-inquisitorial approach.'
A second answer is that the real issue in these contrasting figures is the comparative level of commitment. The fact that Germany uses a system which
requires more judicial time to dispose of each case
does not detract from the further fact that German
legislatures have displayed a willingness to commit
twice as much of the nation's resources to the courts in
order to afford that more expensive approach. They
are according more priority to the achievement of justice in their distribution of public funds.
American lawmakers might pause a moment in
their demands for further economizing by the courts,
with their frequent reluctance to add even a few new
judges or to adequately finance legal assistance for the
poor, in order to contemplate that some other countries are willing to commit substantially more of their
national resources to the dispute resolution function.
In part, these countries may do so because they have
adopted a more expensive approach which they feel

contributes to a higher quality of justice, but their
willingness to make that larger commitment may in
itself be instructive to American policy makers. If we
do not like the quality of justice delivered by our
courts-the delays are too long, too many litigants
suffer because they cannot afford legal representation, and the like-perhaps we should consider raising our public financial commitment to something
closer to that found in some European countries.
This point may be easier to see if we imagine for the
moment that we were comparing one nation's public
investment in fire protection with another. Assume
that Country A invested twice as much tax money per
capita to put out fires as country B. But when this
discrepancy was pointed out to a Professor of Comparative Fire Engines he said, "Sure, Country A
spends twice as much tax money on fire protection.
That doesn't mean anything because in that country
the public pays for the firemen to put out the fire
while Country B only supplies the fire engine and the
driver. It expects the people whose houses are on fire
to hire the people to do most of the rest of the work
(whether they can afford to or not). So you see Country A's legislators aren't any more committed to putting out fires than Country B's."
I guess I see a problem with the logic of the hypothetical Professor of Comparative Fire Engines. Perhaps some readers will also and similarly with Langbein's logic as well.
I also probably should clear away some of the
underbrush from Langbein's critique. He makes a
valid point when he suggests that American lawyers
have a different role-to a certain degree-than their
German counterparts.'" They have somewhat less
responsibility in the litigation process and, as a whole,
more of them spend more of their time offering legal
advice, and in other non-litigous activities. Nonetheless, even making some major adjustment for these
differences does not explain away entirely the two
practicing lawyers per judge in Germany versus 20
practicing lawyers per judge in California (as of 1973).
In California, at the present time, the California Trial
Lawyers Association, which is composed primarily of
only one kind of trial lawyer-those who represent
plaintiffs in personal injury cases-alone has several
times the number of members as there are judges in
the state.
But more significant than the dramatic difference
in ratios between the United States and most European countries is the rapid increase in the size of the
legal profession related to the judiciary since 1965.
This upswing was reflected in a graph in our article
and is highlighted more explicitly in our report."
There has been no comparable upsurge in the number
of lawyers in Germany, France or Italy (in relation to
the number of judges). England and Sweden have actually experienced a downturn in this ratio during the
early 1970s. 2 And with the even more dramatic increases in the size of the American legal profession
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ATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 82-85 (1977).
14. See generally Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1443-61
(1958).
15. The German judiciary cannot be divided into first-instance
and appellate personnel for statistical purposes as easily as ours
can, because the Landgericht-the court of first instance in more
substantial civil and criminal matters-is also the court that conducts review de novo proceedings for the less serious cases that
originate in the local court (Amtsgericht). Nevertheless, published
statistics do hint at the dimensions of German appellate judicial
staffing. For example, at the state supreme court (Oberlandesgericht) level, which is exclusively appellate, there were as of January 1978 some 340 civil chambers and 71 criminal chambers (for a
country with one quarter the U.S. population). Statistisches Bunde-

saint, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1978 fuer die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 321 (table 15.1) (1978). These totals also do not include the appellate chambers in the federal supreme court
(Bundesgerichtshof).
16. JOHNSON & DREW 56 n. 4.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id.

Johnson
(Continuedfrom page 7)
since 1973, it seems reasonable to anticipate that by
1979 the ratio of practicing lawyers to judges in the
United States must be considerably above the 20-to-i
mark, perhaps exceeding 25-to-1 in many jurisdictions. Unless one assumes that none of these new lawyers are engaged in litigation or that there is no relation between the number of lawyers and the number
of disputes that will become lawsuits, it would seem
that the burgeoning size of the American legal profession (relative to the size of the judiciary) does contribute some to backlog, delay, etc., in the courts.
At another point Langbein asserts that "Europeans
tend to handle in specialized or non-judicial tribunals
matters that we process as lawsuits in our ordinary
courts."' 3 This is undoubtedly true. However, it is
also true that in the United States many disputes are
handled in specialized courts or non-judicial tribunals
that would go through regular courts in West Germany or other European countries. Workers' compensation tribunals, welfare fair hearing boards, and
thousands of administrative agency hearing officers
decide literally millions of disputes in the United
States. Many of these categories would end up in the
Labor Courts or Social Courts. He also indicates that
the American figures are "deeply distorted by the pretrial diversion and plea bargaining process that is so
strongly suppressed in West Germany."' 4 But might
not the American system's reliance on plea bargaining
to dispose of so many criminal cases be a symptom, in
part at least, of a court system asked to dispose of too
many criminal cases? To pose the question another
way, would West German courts continue to "strongly
suppress"'" plea bargaining if their caseload were
suddenly doubled or tripled or expanded sixfold
without any increase in judicial manpower or budget?

20. Id. at 11.
21. Compare Halbach, Probate and Estate Planning: Reduced
Need and Cost Through Change in the Law, in DEATH, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 165
(E. Halbach, ed.) (ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law) (1977). German savings banks distribute pamphlets advising their customers on how to draft and execute their own wills,
e.g., "Checkliste: Der geregelte Nachlass" (Frankfurt Sparkasse
1822) (1978).
22. van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Lawyer, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 5, 8
(W. Reese ed.) (Parker School Studies in Foreign and Comparative
Law) (1962).
23. JOHNSON & DREW 11.
24. Id. 56 n. 5.
25. See Langbein, Controlling ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 1. CI. L. REV. 439, 451-52 (1974).
26. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 110-111.
27. See Langbein, supra note 26, at 448-467.
28. See KAPLAN, et al., supra note 10, at 1232-37; KAPLAN, et al.,
supra note 14, at 1461-66.
29. E.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CIHI. L.
REV. 3, 21-22 (1978).

If Langbein was attempting to establish that, on the
average, cases disposed of by West German courts are
six times more complex than the ones that go through
American courts, it would take more proof than he
has offered. In one breath he reminds us that Germany has decriminalized a "host of petty and regulatory offenses" 16 (that is "simple" cases) that are still
handled by the courts in the United States (presumably at rather little cost in time and money). Yet in the
next breath he suggests that America has a much
higher rate of "serious" crime than Germany which
presumably would place a greater demand on America's judicial resources.17
On the other hand, that there are significant differences in the composition and weighted significance
of the caseloads between the United States and West
Germany (or for that matter between Los Angeles and
San Francisco) is beyond dispute. But which way
those differences cut in comparing American and
German caseloads per judge is not apparent on the
surface. It may even be possible that American judges
are asked not only to dispose of a larger caseload but
of a larger caseload of more difficult cases than their
West German counterparts.
Langbein exposes the obvious issue without presenting any convincing evidence that German judges,
on the average, confront vastly more serious and complex disputes. It would require an enormous amount
of very sophisticated research to provide a documented answer to this question. But in the meantime these
comparative caseload ratios tend to suggest that Germany's higher expenditures on the courts cannot be
explained away by a bigger caseload. Beyond that, it
is interesting to note that the higher ratios of caseloads per judge in the United States are accompanied
by higher ratios of private lawyers per judge, higher
police expenditures per judge, larger numbers of prosecutors per judge, etc."
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At times it appears that Langbein is feeling defensive about German judges and the German legal process. 19 But be assured that we were not intending to
criticize the West German system, nor do the statistics
comprise an indictment of the German legal system in
any way. We did not mean to intimate that German
judges do not work very hard or that the inquisitorial
process is necessarily inefficient or undesirable. If
anything, we were suggesting that the statistics constituted a criticism of America's public commitment to
justice.
At the same time I don't want to be construed as
suggesting that we are arguing that solely because
some other industrial democracies commit substantially higher percentages of their national income to
their courts and justice system that the United States
must do so also. We are not in some sort of competition with the other Western democracies to see who
can spend the most on their courts, legal aid, etc. If
we are fully satisfied with the performance of our legal
system at current levels of investment, there is no
reason to contemplate any change, including any
change that might cost more money. But virtually
nothing in either the popular or professional literature
suggests that our justice system is performing perfectly or even very well.
Nor did we mean to suggest that all the problems
with our current system can be solved most effectively
merely by "throwing money" at the legal system. Contrary to Langbein's implication,2" we were not commissioned by LEAA to build a case for increased appropriations. We were given a grant to research and
present comparative statistical data about various
elements of the legal system. We were as astonished as
any American citizen might be with most of the results
of our inquiry. Also contrary to Langbein's implication, be assured that our report would have reflected
what we found even if it had confirmed every American's assumption, that is, that we have more judges
per capita than anybody, that we spend more proportionately than anyone, that we are more generous with
our impoverished litigants than anyone, etc., etc., etc.
(Whether The Judges' Journal would have been as
eager to publish an article presenting some of the
highlights of such a report is a separate question.)
As a matter of fact, contrary to Langbein's assertion, 21 our overall research has not been devoted primarily to building a case for increased funding for the
courts. Nor was that the purpose of our federal government funding. Rather, the bulk of our research in
recent years has been devoted to looking for ways to
process disputes less expensively and better outside
the courts.22
I would be one of the last, once again contrary to
Langbein's apparent assumption, to contend that we
can cure the major problems in the American justice
system merely by appropriating more funds for the
courts as they are presently constituted and as they
presently process disputes. In another context, I have
advocated to the judges themselves that we make fun-

damental changes in how we resolve at least some major categories of disputes in this society. 23
There is a series of complex policy issues to be addressed. How many of the serious deficiencies in the
current American justice system can best be cured by
more judges and increased appropriations for the
courts? How much by more prepaid legal insurance
and more adequate funding of the Legal Services Corporation? How much by the creation of new forums?
How much by diversion of entire categories of disputes
like uncontested divorces and personal injury compensation completely away from the courts? How
much by fundamental restructuring of how the courts
themselves resolve other significant categories of disputes in this society?
In any event, that this society has the resources
with which to finance the necessary measures without
exceeding the commitment displayed by other comparable economies appears fairly clear from the European data. At least that seems to be a reasonable
interpretation.
'John Anthony Kline, Law Reform and the Courts: More Power
to the People or to the Profession? 53 CAL. STATE BAR J. 14, 16
(Jan. /Feb., 1978). Mr. Kline is the Legal Affairs Secretary to Governor Jerry Brown. As such he is the Governor's chief advisor on
judicial appointments, legislation affecting the judicial system and
related matters.
2
Earl Johnson, Jr. and Ann Drew, This Nation Has Money for
Everything-Except Its Courts, 17 JUDGES J. 8, 10, 11 (Summer,
1978, No. 3).
lid. at 11. Moreover, the judiciary's proportion of Gernam national income rose steeply during the early 1970s while it was falling
off in the California and the United States as a whole.
4
The final paragraph of our article is illustrative.
Although these particular statistical comparisons do not conclusively resolve any policy issues, they may disturb certain
widely-accepted assumptions and raise some intriguing new
questions. Explanations for some of the dramatic contrasts
between the United States and other industrial democracies
are probably debatable. But, at the very least, the statistics and
observations we have presented invite our society to consider
seriously whether its public investment in the justice systemparticularly courts and civil legal aid-measures up to that of
analogous nations. (Id. at 56.)
'To place what Langbein quoted into context, consider what appeared before it in the article.
Data. . . suggest that, compared with other jurisdictions, the
public sector of the American dispute resolution system is
much smaller relative to the private sector....
Dispute resolution systems which are unusually dependent
upon the private sector appear particularly subject to problems
caused by economic disparities between litigants. Investigation
of the facts, research of the law and many essential dispute
resolution tasks must be bought and paid for by private citizens.
When one or both parties lack the necessary funds, these
tasks are not performed or are done inadequately. If neither
side is financially able to discharge its responsibilities, the
court is seriously handicapped by lack of evidence and thorough research of the applicable law. If only one litigant lacks
sufficient means, the judge will hear only one version of the
dispute and there is an obvious danger of bias in the result.
Thus, it may be that the American judicial system, which can
deliver a very precise and equitable form of justice under ideal
circumstances, is currently being sabotaged by an inadequate
public investment. (Id. at 56-57.)
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